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The capacity to manage risks and maintain industrial safety is largely based on the capacity of
various actors to acquire, maintain and share knowledge on a large variety of subjects. The
actors are, of course, the plant operator but also the employees, the competent authorities, the exter-
nal maintenance teams or internal or external experts in charge of risk assessment and design of risk
management. The knowledge ranges from the regulatory framework to the details of a machine or a
process but also includes the general knowledge about industrial safety, the hazardous phenomena,
the properties of the substances. Part of this knowledge is also largely tacit. It lies in the brain of the
scientific experts or the employees who are able to make the connection between apparently dis-
connected pieces of knowledge. Detecting, extracting, maintaining and communicating this knowl-
edge are typical knowledge management activities. This is the reason why INERIS has initiated a
research program dedicated to knowledge management with several initial outcomes that will be
presented in this paper together with the general objectives of the program and the perspectives
for the coming years.
The first part of the paper is dedicated to a recall of the knowledge management principles based
mainly on the typology of knowledge introduced by Nonaka. It is put in relation with the typology
of knowledge used in safety management activities. Two examples of knowledge management
systems are presented and related to the typology of knowledge previously described. In both
cases, the added value resides in the capacity to establish relations between different knowledge
elements. This is partly realised by documents indexing and the use of efficient information retrie-
val tools. The development of an ontology of industrial safety contributes to achieving these goals.
It constitutes a reference for indexing and will offer a structure for future developments of semantic
web-based tools. Such an ontology is presently under development. Its use to improve the indexing
and information retrieval in the knowledge management systems is illustrated.
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INTRODUCTION
Human factor is the cause of up to 80% of industrial acci-
dents [Cacciabue, 2000]. In a recent paper Z. Nivolianitou
[Nivolianitou, 2006] analysed the full accident reports in the
MARS database and showed that after examination, many
causes initially classified as equipment failure were actually
due to organisational factors. An examination of accident
reports and recommendations in the accident databases
shows that in many cases the organisational deficiencies can
be formulated in terms of lack of knowledge. A frequent con-
clusion is that there is a lack of training of operators, but often,
it is a more general lack of knowledge of risks or safety issues
associated with equipment or substances that caused an insuf-
ficient control of the situation. This lack of knowledge is, for
example, the lack of preliminary knowledge that would have
led to a risk analysis, the lack of risk analysis itself, the lack
of communication of safety critical information, the lack of
application of hazard lessons learned from similar activities.
In her conclusions concerning the petrochemical industry,
Z. Nivolianitou considers that there is a lack of proper safety
culture to enable effective use of available knowledge for
the prevention of major accidents and that there is a lack of a
structured communication system to diffuse this knowledge.
This conclusion is used to stress the need of a major
accident reporting system to collect and diffuse the knowl-
edge on industrial accidents. However it can also be
extended to the need of a more general knowledge manage-
ment system dedicated to managing the knowledge necess-
ary to deal with industrial risks. This paper is dedicated to
presenting some elements of such a system. It introduces
the basis of knowledge management, explores the variety
of knowledge involved in safety management situations
and presents a first structure of a KM system. It then deals
with the potential applications of ontologies to improve
the KM activities.
WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT?
Knowledge Management (KM) refers to a range of practices
used by organisations to identify, create, represent, and dis-
tribute knowledge for reuse, awareness and learning across
the organisation1.
1Definition from Wikipedia, example of a participatory knowledge
management system.
MANAGING TACIT AND EXPLICIT KNOWLEDGE
The knowledge can be divided into two main categories: the
explicit knowledge and the tacit knowledge [Nonaka 1994].
Explicit knowledge is the knowledge that is conscious and
can be documented. Tacit knowledge is the knowledge
that resides in the people's mind in a more or less formalised
form, most of the time unconsciously. Nonaka identifies the
various operations that can be undertaken on knowledge.
Transforming the tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge
is often called formalisation or externalisation. Making
explicit knowledge accessible to people who may benefit
from it is diffusion. Making the explicit knowledge turn
into tacit knowledge of actors who will then be able to use
it is internalisation. A complete knowledge management
system should be able to perform all these tasks. It should
also be able to deal with generic and specific knowledge.
GENERIC VERSUS SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE
Beside the traditional tacit versus explicit classification of
knowledge the distinction between generic and specific
knowledge is essential. Generic knowledge corresponds to
the general concepts. Specific corresponds to the instances
of these concepts in a given context. Competence is the
ability to use generic knowledge in a specific context.
Many situations illustrate this need to possess generic
knowledge that will be used to extract and interpret specific
information or knowledge. Among them, risk analysis is the
most emblematic. On the other hand, learning from experi-
ence, and especially from past accidents obeys to the oppo-
site process. It is specific knowledge that is used to produce
generic information that will be used in other context to
interpret specific data.
However, there is a large variety of knowledge man-
agement system structures and processes answering to a
large variety of needs. Designing a KM system requires fol-
lowing a series of steps that will be described in the next
paragraphs.
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN
RELATION WITH INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
The issue of the application of knowledge management to
industrial safety is not new. The need for a safety related
knowledge management strategy was already stressed in
1996 by F. Lees who wrote "knowledge of its processes
and plants is one of the prime assets of a company, but
the management of this asset often appears to be relatively
neglected". Yet, it seems that the link between knowledge
management and industrial safety has not been intensively
dealt with by researchers in the last decade except for the
implementation and exploitation of a learning from acci-
dents system. In the meantime however, knowledge man-
agement has become an issue in many companies.
Different factors contribute to the development of
knowledge management. Companies are facing an ever
more complex world because of the evolution of technol-
ogies. They have to react quickly to keep their rank in the
economic competition. They must be able to capitalise
former experience. At the same time they are facing new
threats such as the retirement of generations of experienced
workers, the transformations due to fusion and reorganis-
ations of entire economic sectors. All these evolutions are
seen as having a potential impact on the economic capacity
of the companies. They also can have an impact on safety.
Authors such as Rassmussen, Svendung or Leveson have
considered the accidents in the light of the socio-technical
model of system operation. In such an approach, the infor-
mation subsystem plays an important role in the develop-
ment of accidents. Knowledge management at various
organisational levels is thus a key among the others to
improve safety of industrial activities.
SPECIFYING AND IMPLEMENTING A
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
A first approach of the design of a knowledge management
system is user-centred. It focuses on the future users of the
system, their needs and the way they will use the system.
The users are not only the beneficiary of the formalised
knowledge but also the actors owning a tacit or explicit
knowledge that will be used as input to the system. The fol-
lowing questions are thus in the heart of the design process:
Who will be the users?
Which are the various user types?
What are their characteristics and behaviours?
What are their goals and tasks?
In which situations and contexts will they operate the
system?
What types of knowledge is going to be processed by the
system?
What are the tools and organisation already existing?
What is the life cycle of knowledge in the organisation, how
is it validated, when and how does it become obsolete?
The users of a safety related Knowledge Management
system could be all the actors involved in the industrial
safety management at the various stages of an industrial
plant: design, building, operation, maintenance, shutdown,
decommissioning. Those actors are, authorities, process
experts, risk experts, plant designers, plant builders, plant
operators, plant workers, plant management staff, contrac-
tors. Their needs are different but they all interact with
common knowledge elements and should be able to share
common representations, to be aware of risks associated
with given substances or equipment and to take sound
decisions within the organisation.
Examples of knowledge associated with safety of
hazardous equipment are given in [Wintle, 2006] where
the key competencies required to manage equipment con-
taining hazardous and/or pressurised fluids are listed. This
knowledge ranges from very general competencies such as
education and training in technical and mechanical engin-
eering or teamwork skills and understanding the roles of
others to very specific knowledge such as familiarity with
the equipment concerned, together with the detail of the
design and materials of construction, and the operation and
maintenance requirements or understanding of the relevant
regulatory requirements and any approved code of practice
and guidance for the equipment.
This list illustrates the large variety of knowledge
involved in safety related processes and the difficulty of
setting up a knowledge management system dedicated to
safety aspects. In fact an ideal knowledge management
system should be able to deal with information, i.e. explicit
formalised knowledge, skills, which can be considered as
tacit knowledge, and competence which is the ability to
operate explicit and tacit knowledge in a given context.
Safety culture should also be in the heart of a reflection on
safety related knowledge management. Safety culture is
the capacity to interpret information and give it a sense in
terms of safety. In addition, it is the understanding of
safety concepts, safety operations and rules.
TOWARDS THE DEFINITION OF SAFETY
CRITICAL KNOWLEDGE
Given this general context, our objective is to define and set
up a knowledge management system that would enable the
industry to better manage its safety critical knowledge. This
objective imposes to define the Safety Critical Knowledge
(SCK). In a first approach it could be defined as the knowl-
edge necessary to design, build, operate, maintain and shut-
down a system in safe conditions. SCK is the knowledge
that can, if it fails, lead to an accident or an increase of
the accident probability. It includes the knowledge necess-
ary to operate the safety barriers and the emergency pro-
cedures. It is also the contextual knowledge necessary to
understand the safety management context and proceed to
the risk communication operations.
SCK can be identified in various situations at differ-
ent stages in the life cycle of the plant:
Design: The SCK is, for example, the knowledge
necessary to identify potential risks of the future plant and
design the process, storage and other plant equipment to
inherently reduce the risk. It is also the knowledge necessary
to design the safety devices and procedures. Several authors
have dealt with the safety critical knowledge management in
the design phase (refs).
Building: The SCK is, for example, the knowledge
that will ensure that building procedures and building
codes are understood and respected and that the plant will
be built to operate safely.
Operation: During operation of a hazardous plant,
the SCK is the knowledge that will ensure that the plant is
operated safely: understanding of the signs, procedures,
rules, information on the process but also of the safety
devices and procedures that are used to control potential
accident scenarios.
Maintenance: There are many examples of wrong
operations done in maintenance that were responsible of
major accidents. In many cases, the knowledge of the main-
tenance team was not suitable to interpret the potential con-
sequences of the choices made during the maintenance
operation. On the other hand, risk-based maintenance is
developing as a means to optimise the maintenance
process. Risk-based maintenance relies on the active proces-
sing of knowledge on the installation and its equipment,
including the use of learning from accidents or incidents.
Decommissioning: Decommissioning is also a criti-
cal phase of a plant life. During this phase, operators are
faced with aspects of the plant that they didn't have the
opportunity to see during the operation. At this stage,
generic knowledge and knowledge gained from learning
from other's experience are essential.
SAFETY CRITICAL KNOWLEDGE AND SPECIFIC
SAFETY MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES
Within the general life cycle of an industrial plant, some
activities have a specific role in the safety management
process and are of special interest in terms of knowledge
management because of their specific role in the knowledge
identification and production process but also because they
allow to stress some of the functions that are expected
from a safety critical knowledge management system.
EMERGENCY PLANNING AND INTERVENTION
Emergency situations are clearly situations in which safety
critical knowledge is mobilised. Emergency rescue teams
must have an immediate access to all the information and
more generally knowledge useful for understanding the
accident and its potential consequences in order to design
a safe and efficient intervention strategy. The peculiarity
of these situations is the time constraint which prohibits
the delivery of a noisy information and imposes that tacit
knowledge and personal skills compensate the lack of
information.
LEARNING FROM ACCIDENT
Learning from accidents is typically a knowledge manage-
ment activity. It can take various aspects: in depth analysis
of accidents to set up improvements, accident databases
describing accident scenarios, analysis of the emergency
response of an organisation facing an accident. But exploit-
ing the information contained in accident databases remains
a difficult task because of the lack of efficient information
retrieval tools. Knowledge management technologies
exposed in the following paragraphs can also contribute to
improving the learning from accident process.
RISK ASSESSMENT: A KNOWLEDGE INTENSIVE
TASK
Risk analysis, and more generally risk assessment, is a
knowledge formalisation process in the sense that it consists
in extracting tacit knowledge from the participants of a risk
analysis work group and turning it into explicit knowledge.
Yet to do so, risk analysis also requires that the participants
have quite an extensive explicit knowledge both at a specific
and generic level. Figure 1 describes the various types of
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Figure 1. Various types of knowledge involved in the risk analysis process
knowledge involved in the risk analysis process. Projects
such as ARAMIS [Salvi, 2006] have also produced large
amounts of risk analysis specific knowledge. A first issue
is how to make this necessary knowledge available to the
actors. This is partly the goal of a tool like PRIMARISK
described below.
Another issue is how to insure that risk analysis
results will remain useful and known by the safety manage-
ment actors. Risk analysis is among the best way to produce
SCK. Far too often, risk analysis remains under exploited
once the decisions for which it was done have been taken.
At best, it is read by operators or maintenance teams
before new decisions are taken. At worst it ends up lost
somewhere in the plant. However there should be a means
to make risk analysis results easily available as a central
piece of the safety management system.
AN EXAMPLE OF GENERIC KNOWLEDGE
ACCESS TOOL: PRIMARISK
As described in figure 1, the risk expert uses a large variety
of models and data associated to the various steps of risk
assessment processes. To make these models, tools and
data available to the risk assessment community, INERIS
is presently developing the resource platform PRI-
MARISKw [Debray, 2005]. It is available on INERIS web
site since January 20072. The next paragraphs describe the
2Http://www.ineris.fr/primarisk
main features of this web platform and present its basic
structure in relation with the needs of potential users.
Specific risk assessment processes are defined by the
legislation, standards or state of the art. At the end of its
development, PRIMARISK will describe several risk
assessment processes related to the main activity domains
of INERIS. The first to be implemented in PRIMARISK is
the safety report of a hazardous industrial plant as it is
required by the transposition of the SEVESO II directive.
It involves the following steps:
• Description of the plant;
• Identification of the hazardous pieces of equipment;
• Selection of the pertinent equipment;
• Risk analysis;
• Identification of the safety barriers;
• Assessment of the consequences of accidents;
• Definition of the safety control and requirements for the
safety management system.
Each of these steps mobilises a specific knowledge.
The description of the process is explicit but the understand-
ing of which models, tools and data to use is more of a tacit
type. The expertise lies in the ability to use the right model
for a given hazardous situation. It lies also in the capacity to
understand the results of the process. In PRIMARISKw ,
each steps is described in terms of objectives. The relevant
legislative texts are given together with other reference text,
when they exist. Then the tasks are listed. Each of them is
described and linked with useful resources and knowledge
elements that will ease the risk assessment.
The resources can be of three main types:
• Local resources: PRIMARISK lists the elements of
information that the person in charge of the risk assess-
ment has to obtain from the plant operator such as the
maps or process instrumentation diagrams.
• General resources: These are the resources available
elsewhere that the user should consult to obtain useful
information. Most of these resources are available
online from INERIS or other web sites. Among these
are databases, documentation, etc.
• Specific resources available directly from PRIMARISK:
These are tools and databases that were developed
specially for being made accessible through PRI-
MARISK. For example, PRIMARSIK supports a series
of computer models for the online calculation of effect
distances of hazardous phenomena such as BLEVE,
Boil-Over and pool fire. Other models are being devel-
oped and should constitute progressively a global tool
kit for major industrial risk assessment.
Figure 2 shows the general structure of PRI-
MARISKw. The core system was implemented on a data-
base and establishes the link with classical web pages and
more specific online software.
EXAMPLE OF A SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Prior to PRIMARISK, which is dedicated mostly to external
users, INERIS has set up an internal document management
tool called GEIDE. It is the collection of all the documents
produced by INERIS personnel. These are of very varied
types ranging from reports to short notes or quality manage-
ment procedures. The primary objective of this system was
knowledge capitalisation, aiming at making any knowledge
production by INERIS available to INERIS experts. GEIDE
is thus a huge document database which uses a Verity K2
search engine. Queries can be formulated in natural
language on the full text or on specific meta-data fields.
The difficulty both in PRIMARISK and GEIDE
resides in the capacity of a user to formulate a precise
query and in the number of documents that can be retrieved
from one query. Depending on the quality of this query, the
results can be either too scarce or too many. To improve the
search efficiency, it is necessary to develop new search tools
based on semantic technologies. This is done by developing
an ontology of industrial safety and tools to exploit this
ontology in PRIMARISK and GEIDE.
DEFINITION OF AN ONTOLOGY OF INDUSTRIAL
SAFETY FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF
KNOWLEDGE RETRIEVAL
Ontologies are efficient structures used to formalise the
knowledge of a specific domain. An ontology contains a
set of concepts of the studied domain organised in a hierar-
chy of classes and sub-classes along with other relations
between them. In practical terms, developing an ontology
includes defining classes of concepts, arranging them into
a taxonomic (subclass-superclass) hierarchy, defining prop-
erties and their facets (constraints). A knowledge base can
then be created by defining individual instances of these
classes filling in specific property value information and
additional property restrictions.
Developing ontologies has many advantages men-
tioned by N. F. Noy and D. L. McGuinnes, 2001:
• Share a common understanding of the structure of infor-
mation among people or software agents.
• Enable reuse of domain knowledge.
• Make domain assumptions explicit.
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Figure 2. General structure of PRIMARISK
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BUILDING AN ONTOLOGY OF INDUSTRIAL
SAFETY
Ontology tools were developed to extract terms from the
documents present in PRIMARISK and existing glossaries.
Experts were then asked to organise this knowledge into
classes and subclasses, defining the properties of classes
and their relations. Building the ontology was initiated
using the Protégé 3.3 ontology editor and other tools devel-
oped specifically [Abou Assali, 2006]. The process is
described in Figure 3. A first version of the ontology was
built and used as a test support for the elaboration of an
information retrieval system described in Figure 4. The
evolution of this ontology will continue in the coming
years as a central knowledge formalisation process.
CURRENT USE OF THE ONTOLOGY
A simple ontology-based information retrieval system was
developed to improve the search capabilities in PRI-
MARISK and will be soon adapted to the GEIDE system.
From a first input of the user, this tool proposes the list of
concepts containing at least one of the entered words. The
user chooses the concept that suits most his query. Then, a
list of related close terms is proposed. A close term is
defined as any term having a direct relationship with the
initial term. This relation can be an is_a relation but also
any other type of relation such as the produces relation
described in Figure 5.
For example, a user entering the keyword "ATEX
explosion" will be proposed to refine his query by choosing
among "gas explosion" and "dust explosion" but also "over-
pressure effect" and "thermal effect". This system allows at
the same time for a better formulation of the query by the
user and offers possibilities of refinement or enrichment of
the results. Indeed the user has the choice to limit the
search to the specific term of the ontology that best describes
his search or to enlarge the results to all the documents
linked to this term by a specific relation (close terms).
POTENTIAL USE IN THE FUTURE
This first application of the ontology can be compared with
that of thesaurus and structured lists such as the one realised
in the S-2-S project [Nomen, 2006]. It is a first step. But the
ontology can have many other applications. Its ability to
represent a variety of relations between abstract concepts
and concrete instances makes it a very powerful tool for
information processing and knowledge management. The
next step of the research project is the use of an ontology
to represent plant specific knowledge (description of equip-
ment, procedures, etc.) and to make the link between this
PRIMARISK DB Documents
and resources
Figure 4. Architecture of the search system in PRIMARISK exploiting the ontology structure
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Figure 5. Examples class hierarchy of concepts in the ontology of industrial safety and examples of semantic relation between
concepts
ontology and the ontology of industrial safety to index docu-
ments and elements of Safety Critical Knowledge.
Examples of such approaches for the taking into account
of safety requirements in the design and maintenance activi-
ties are given by [Bragatto 2006, Ansaldi 2006]. This will
constitute a first element of a safety critical knowledge man-
agement system. In the future, the ontology will also be used
to structure the content of PRIMARISK and GEIDE so that
this information can be better accessible and shared with
other actors including other risk specialised institutes.
Indeed an ontology is not only a set of concepts and relations
but also a complete database structure in which the instances
of concepts can be compared to database records. The same
ontology will thus become the common tool for knowledge
formalisation (defining the concepts and relations), infor-
mation search and retrieval and database structure
definition.
CONCLUSION
Through the description of the variety of knowledge
involved in various activities and plant life cycle stages,
this paper has underlined the critical role of knowledge in
the safety management. The concept of Safety Critical
Knowledge is introduced and the need for a Safety critical
Knowledge management system are sketched. To answer
some of these needs, INERIS has set up a knowledge
access tools for external use (PRIMARISK) and an internal
knowledge management system (GEIDE). It has also
initiated the development of an ontology of industrial
safety which will become a basis for knowledge formalisa-
tion (defining the concepts and relations), information retrie-
val and retrieval and database structure definition. This
ontology proposes a representation of the main concepts
of industrial safety and their relations. It is presently used
to improve the document search in PRIMARISK and
GEIDE but will soon provide the base for the definition of a
more general Safety Critical Knowledge management
system.
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